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Protection of the EnvironmentCivil Society and Global Security: Russia’s Decision to Import Spent Nuclear FuelMaria Tysiachniouk Chair of the Department of Environmental Sociology Center for Independent Social Research St. Petersburg, Russia Jonathan Reisman Intern Center for Independent Social Research St. Petersburg, Russia Introduction The current discourse in Russia regarding nuclear energy centers on the maintenance of old nuclear power stations, the building of new stations and the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. On December 21, 2000, the Russian State Duma held its first reading of three additions to the current Russian legislation on this matter. The first was an amendment to the Environmental Protection Law that lifts the ban on permanently storing foreign spent nuclear fuel. The second concerned the adoption of special ecological programs for radiologically polluted regions of the Russian Federation, funded by profits from trade operations with spent nuclear fuel. The third changed and amended federal law on the use of nuclear energy (1). The Ministry of Nuclear Energy of the Russian Federation (Minatom) proposes the transport, reprocessing and permanent burial of foreign spent nuclear fuel within Russia during the period from 2000 to 2010. Throughout the ratification process there was extensive opposition both from environmental organizations operating in Russia and the Russian population itself. The Agency for International Interaction conducted and published an opinion poll of residents living in five cities in Siberia, whose results indicated that 90% of those questioned were against importing spent nuclear fuel (2). The discourse within Russia was accompanied by international reaction to the passing of these new laws in Russia (3). This question is widely discussed in national and international environmental journals, as well as in the mass media (4). However, there has been no sociological analysis to date of this issue in the context of inter-sectoral decision-making. The tension found in this case also highlights the relationships among civil rights, human rights for a clean environment, and democratic legislative processes. National and global security is an important issue for all facets of society that are affected by the various actors and stakeholders. This article presents the results of a qualitative sociological study based on six in-depth interviews conducted with representatives of the State Duma, and four interviews with activists from major environmental organizations, as well as an analysis of documents produced by both sets of interviewees, in which they express opinions for and against the new legislation. It also discusses how decisions concerning the disposal of spent nuclear fuel are made in Russia’s current political and social context. It also analyzes the methods and tactics that environmental organizations use to promote their viewpoint, including claims of possible nuclear accidents and terrorism. This trans-boundary issue is discussed in the context of its relationship to global security. The Government’s Position on the Issue There are currently two major nuclear complexes in Russia, one called Mayak located in the small city of Ozersk, and another in the city Zheleznogorsk (5). At both facilities there are storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel produced by Russian-type power plants and reactors. According to official documents published by the Ministry of Nuclear Energy of the Russian Federation (Minatom), these storage facilities are both safe and secure (6). Minatom’s plan for importing spent nuclear fuel requires reconstruction at these two sites, as well as the construction of two additional major storage units in order to handle both the volume and the type of spent nuclear fuel from abroad. They claim that Russia will then have the capacity to accept 20,000 tons of imported Russian-type or foreign-type spent nuclear fuel from foreign plants between the years 2000 and 2010. Because the plants are now operating at only 35-40% of their normal capacity, the ministry claims that importing foreign spent nuclear fuel will not hinder the storage of domestic spent fuel. Before the recent change in legislation, Russia could only legally import foreign spent nuclear fuel from Russian-type reactors, reprocess it, and then return it. For this service, the country received $600 to $1,000 per kilogram of fuel. However, according to the new amended laws, it is not mandatory to return this imported spent fuel. In exchange for reprocessing and permanently storing the spent fuel, Russia will receive double the payment at $1,200 to $2,000 per kilogram of fuel. The Ministry of Nuclear Energy is attracted to what it views is an important opportunity to procure money, which it claims will be spent to solve the social, economic, and ecological problems of the country. Much of this money will also go towards new technology to reprocess the fuel itself. Minatom will use this money to finish construction of a reprocessing facility called RT-2, begun in 1984 and whose partial construction has already cost $350 million. According to Minatom’s figures, Russia will be left with $7.2 billion after the necessary spending on transport, storage, reprocessing facilities, and burial (7). Regarding the spent fuel’s transportation, Minatom wrote in its published article that Russia has extensive experience with such operations, since Russia has been reprocessing domestic and some foreign spent nuclear fuel from Eastern Europe since 1977 at the Mayak plant. Since this reprocessing has involved transporting the spent fuel, routes from foreign plants to Mayak are already established and deemed safe and secure. Therefore, Minatom does not regard this operation as a threat to Russian security, and, on the contrary, believes profits that are spent in the Russian economy will aid in the stabilization of the country as a whole. In addition, Minatom asserts in one of its brochures that claims of a “global nuclear threat” associated with the importation of spent nuclear fuel represent Western bias against Russia’s participation in the market for spent nuclear fuel (8). Minatom refers to the nuclear sector as a “life-saving branch of the Russian economy” and attributes claims of “broken down nuclear containers, nuclear waste dumps, polluted drinking water, and human mutants” to “confusion and ignorance,” and even accuses environmental NGOs of lying and exaggerating such claims. According to the government’s position, the importing of spent nuclear fuel can only profit Russia and will not adversely affect global security and safety. The Position of Environmental Organizations Many environmental organizations criticize the new legislation as excessively vague in its requirements. First, the new amendments do not provide guidelines for what will happen to the spent nuclear fuel after the contract with its exporting country expires. It places a priority on returning the spent fuel but it does not explicitly mandate it. Second, there is no mention of the responsibilities of the territories through which the spent fuel will be transported. Furthermore, ecological experts from the environmental assessment commission organized by the Duma claim that signing this legislation is a violation of the precautionary principles as specified in Statute 3 of the Russian law on environmental protection (9). These principles place a priority on rejecting decisions that may have irreversible consequences on the environment and human health. People have already suffered illness and death caused by the accident in 1957 at the Mayak nuclear site in the Chelyabinsk region. Local residents and environmental activists see the addition of more nuclear waste to the area as ludicrous (10). This past record of failure to prevent accidents leads many critics to distrust Russia’s ability to transport and store the imported spent fuel safely. According to Minatom’s logistical plan, several hundred trains carrying spent nuclear fuel from abroad will travel through Russia in the next decade. One activist cites statistics indicating that a railroad accident occurs approximately once per week in Russia (11), adding to the skepticism that spent nuclear fuel can be safely transported by train. As a result, many view the importing of spent nuclear fuel as a danger to Russian security and health, as well as the safety and security of the international community. Since the imported spent fuel must be stored for twenty years before reprocessing, opponents argue that this long-term commitment to safe disposal is impossible in Russia where the future is so unpredictable given the unstable social and political situation (12). It is clear to environmental organizations that the social and political context in which decisions are made has an important affect on the security of the world as a whole, especially decisions concerning trans-boundary issues such as the possible dangers of nuclear energy. Regarding Minatom’s endorsement of the project’s profitability, many environmental groups question both the probability of this profit, as well as its intended use, if any such profit is actually realized. Various opponents also doubt that other countries will even be interested in exporting spent nuclear fuel to Russia, siting that France and Great Britain already very effectively and safely reprocess foreign spent fuel. In East Asia, which Minatom projects is a major source of potential spent fuel imports (13), a preliminary agreement was signed in July 2001 between the United States, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and China to collaborate in the utilization of spent nuclear fuel (14). Alexey Yablokov, a renowned environmental activist in Russia, brings attention to the fact that while Minatom claims it will use profits for social and environmental programs, the budget money currently used to build nuclear plants in China and India could be directed towards these goals without the intermediate step of dealing with nuclear material (15). Such perceived inconsistencies lead many opponents to see Minatom’s purpose as not merely profit, but rather the long-term development and permanent investment in the nuclear branch of the Russian economy (16). Independent of Minatom’s actual goals, the project will necessarily include the modernization of Russian nuclear energy, however, many critics do not see this as a positive step for the economy. The planned importation will bring large amounts of plutonium to Russia, and some point out that while this will promote the development of plutonium-fueled nuclear power plants, many other industrialized countries are now trying to phase out nuclear energy and plutonium fuel in particular (17). Alexey Yablokov also argues against investment in nuclear energy by pointing out that Russia possesses vast coal and oil reserves to serve Russia’s energy needs, and that with some effort exerted towards energy efficiency and conservation, an overall energy savings of 40% is possible (18). Given the potential for alternative energies, Yablokov considers the use of all nuclear energy as an unnecessary strain on the environment and Russian society. NGO and Government Interaction in the Legislative Process Environmental organizations in Russia do not often employ the tactic of working with legislators. However, the spent nuclear fuel issue mobilized mass opposition and many organizations began lobbying extensively. Since 1996, when a statute allowing the importation of spent nuclear fuel first appeared, both Greenpeace and the Socio-Ecological Union (SEU) have been mobilizing interaction between activists and regional and federal officials in a variety of ways. In a mass effort, people contacted their regional elected officials and requested that they block the new legislation on the regional level, once after the first reading of the amendments in the State Duma and again after the second reading. In addition, opponents of the legislation picketed regional deputy councils on the oblast, krai, and republic levels of government. Twelve of these councils supported the demands of the environmental movement and sent a package of documents to the State Duma in Moscow expressing these views. On the federal level, Greenpeace sends leaflets and information to government officials, while members of the SEU conduct ecological assessments of the proposed legislation, and also write letters, meet with officials, and suggest and analyze relevant literature for deputies (Interview with the assistant to state deputy Mytrochin, 2002). Environmental NGOs educate legislators with scientific data, public petitions and relevant current events, so that they can make informed decisions. Accordingly, organizations have long-term contact with certain deputies who assist in disseminating this information to all elected officials. According to our respondent from the Duma, information from the NGOs is sought by state deputies when environmental legislation is under consideration (Interview with the assistant to state deputy Mytrochin, 2002). Deputies and their assistants from Fraction Yabloko contact Greenpeace, for instance, to consult with them about how to vote on certain environmental issues. Officials tend to establish relations with trustworthy environmental organizations that they can consistently rely on for good information and advice. They may also rely on such established sources of environmental expertise when initiating their own legislation. Our respondent from the Duma said that Greenpeace is a special asset to many deputies because it has sufficient funding to perform free consultation services. Greenpeace employs a person in the Moscow office whose main responsibility is to work with state deputies. The SEU, on the other hand, has limited funding and, therefore, works toward influencing legislation only when very important issues arise, such as importing spent fuel. It specializes in distributing information throughout the environmental movement and the public through various media outlets, including the electronic forum Ecological North West Line. Hence, deputies are able to use the SEU as an effective channel for getting out their own views and information on environmental issues (Interview with the assistant to state deputy Mytrochin, 2002). Because Greenpeace operates with funding from abroad, it is able to spend more time lobbying and consulting with elected officials on decision-making. This type of NGO participation in the legislative process is necessary for effective democracy. The ability of the population to protect itself from what it perceives as harmful governmental programs, as is the case with the importing of spent nuclear fuel to Russia, is dependent on a democratic and representative decision-making process. Because this issue and its possible dangers are trans-boundary, money spent by the international community is money spent towards its own security as well. An ecological commission was organized with representatives of environmental NGOs for the readings of the proposed legislation. According to Lidia Popova, Director of the Center for Nuclear Ecology and a former Minatom employee, the Committee of Ecology was reassembled after the last State Duma elections under the strong influence of Minatom and the law for importing spent nuclear fuel was proposed (Interview, 2002). Popova believes that the current members are pro-nuclear and unconcerned with environmental problems, and she cites the new chair of this committee, Vladimir Grachov, as a major promoter of legalizing the importation of spent nuclear fuel. While the first reading of these amendments did not include any environmental assessment, Popova and other environmental experts were invited to contribute to the second reading. The result was an extensive list of criticisms, which would have prevented the legislation from passing if they had been properly considered (Interview with Lidia Popova, 2002). Unfortunately, the conclusions of the environmental experts were not signed and following the next ecological assessment, which found the proposed project environmentally acceptable, the Duma passed the law through to the President. Popova believes that she was not invited to this final assessment because her suggestions at the previous meeting were perceived as too radical (Interview, 2002). She claims that when the list of invitees was reviewed, people such as herself and Yablokov, the Director of the Center for Environmental Policy, were eliminated based on anti-nuclear sentiment and reputation. Therefore, it appears that the Russian parliament made its decision without due democratic process in this instance. Many environmental activists regard Minatom’s influence on legislation as a big and powerful pro-nuclear lobby that violates the proper democratic procedures for decision-making. One Greenpeace respondent called Minatom “a state within the state” that does whatever it wants and answers to no one (Interview, 2002). In another initiative to monopolize the legislative process, Minatom formed what some call “pocket environmental organizations” through which it attempted to show environmental support for its decision. Members of two of these groups Kedr and Green Scarfs appear on a series of television programs in which they assured the public that the environmental movement is supporting the importation of spent nuclear fuel. A respondent from Green Scarfs told us that he supports the Committee for Ecology in all of its decisions (Interview, 2002). Referendums The principal means of widespread environmental opposition to the importation of spent nuclear fuel was the organization of a nationwide referendum against the project. On July 26, 2000 environmental organizations throughout Russia including Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, the Socio-Ecological Union (SEU), the Center for Biodiversity Conservation, Baikalskaya Volna, and the Ecological Watcher of Sakhalin, as well as many small organizations and students groups, began collecting signatures from Russian citizens to show their disapproval of the legislation concerning spent nuclear fuel. This effort required a significant consolidation of the environmental movement and cooperation among over 100 organizations. Within three months, 2.5 million Russians had signed in support of the preventative referendum. Upon submission to the Regional Election Committees, over 600,000 of these signatures were declared invalid. This effectively blocked the efforts of the environmental opposition, since, according to Russian legislation on referendums, at least two million signatures are required to force a national referendum. The Regional Election Committees cited improper addresses as justification for disqualifying many of the signatures. Unfortunately, many villages in Russia have no streets, so such “proper addresses” are not possible for the villagers (19). Environmental organizations appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia to overturn this judgement, but the appeal was rejected. However, when they appealed to the regional courts in eight other regions of Russia, one of them accepted the claim. Greenpeace took this appeal one step further by applying to the European Court in Strasburg on the charge of human rights violations. At the time of this writing the European Court has accepted the application that the right to organize a referendum was denied and is deliberating the issue. Citizens and environmental activists claim that the people’s democratic right to play a role in the legislative process was violated, since the ability to force a referendum is an important channel for the Russian public to participate in decision-making and that channel was blocked in this case. Direct Action and Increasing Public Awareness Direct action played a critical role in the campaign to prevent the importation of spent nuclear fuel and against the nuclear energy program in general. Protests, informational campaigns, and fax- and letter-attacks on the Duma were conducted by Greenpeace, the SEU and many smaller organizations throughout the discussion period of the proposed legislation, as well as after it was signed into law. On October 9, 2000, approximately one week after the first draft of the new legislation was submitted to the Duma, Greenpeace and villagers from Russia’s Chelyabinsk region placed barrels of radioactive soil from farms and gardens affected by the Mayak nuclear site, which is the planned destination of imported spent nuclear fuel, on the steps of the Duma building. In an attempt to protest adding more radioactive materials to this area, Greenpeace activists used a Geiger counter to prove that this soil already contained thirty times more than normal background radiation levels (20). Later, in June 2001, when the Duma was discussing the final phases of ratification, there was a nation-wide ceremony aimed at capturing President Putin’s attention before he signed the amendments, during which people congregated in the main city squares and burned candles. In Moscow, activists inflated large balloons with anti-nuclear requests written by children to President Putin (21). One of the biggest instances of direct action took place in October 2001 after the president had already signed the new legislation. In cities all along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, activists organized by the SEU and Ecodefense! went to railway stations and announced that they would not allow spent nuclear fuel from abroad to be transported through their cities. There was no obstruction of the transport of spent nuclear fuel, however, because the first shipment from Bulgaria had not yet entered Russia. With many television and radio stations reporting, people distributed leaflets linking the dangers of transporting the fuel and international terrorism (22). In Ekaterinburg the main slogan of the protest was “Radioactive Trains Are Our Greatest Gift to Bin Laden.” The theme of international terrorism continued to resurface in the criticisms of importing and transporting spent nuclear fuel in Russia. Although the decision-making process on these issues occurs only inside Russia’s State Duma, its ramifications are quite trans-boundary. Activists assert that the insecure transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel not only threatens the safety of Russians, but also could result in a worldwide threat. Opponents of the legislation use to their advantage the increase in international concern for security since September 11, 2001. On February 15, 2002, State Duma deputy Sergei Mytrochin, along with journalists and representatives of Greenpeace Russia, overrode security and were able to reach the rooftop of a spent fuel processing plant in Krasnoyarsk, demonstrating to the media and public the lack of security at the facility and raising concern for the activities of the nuclear sector. This particular plant holds 3,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel and the addition of 20,000 tons has been proposed. The activists claimed that if terrorists with even a small bomb gained access to the facility in the way that they did, they could cause a disaster measuring five times that of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (23). The international nature of this issue extends beyond the issue of security, as illustrated by the transboundary work of many environmental groups, for example, Greenpeace’s appeal to the European Court as previously mentioned, and discussions with governments of G7 countries and others with the potential to export spent fuel to Russia. Greenpeace also campaigns extensively via the Internet to an international audience. Similarly, the SEU organized informational campaigns in Taiwan, which is one possible source of spent nuclear fuel to Russia (Interview with SEU activist, 2002), during which they distributed materials containing information such as updates on the recent protests in Russia. Ecodefense!, which was originally formed as a branch of the SEU, has created an office in Germany where it vigorously disseminates to citizens information against exporting the country’s spent nuclear fuel and the nuclear program in general. Similar activities were organized in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, in 1998-99 through a temporary Ecodefense! branch office in eastern Europe. Foreign activists also frequently appear at Russian protests, according to our respondents. At a SEU informational summer camp in 1998, activists from Sweden, Norway, France and the Norwegian environmental organization Bellonna helped draw attention to a power plant on the Kolsky peninsula that activists consider to be old and dangerous. The SEU has organized similar informational camps each year at various locations from 1998 to 2000. They cancelled the summer camp program for the year 2001, however, because they were so heavily involved in lobbying the Duma while the legislation on importing spent fuel was passing through (Interview with the director of the SEU nuclear campaign, 2000). Democracy, Civil Liberties and Global Security Russia is a young democracy in a period of transition, and, as a result, interest groups have little experience with activities such as lobbying. Most organizations do not typically work with federal legislators in this way, though the issue of importing spent nuclear fuel into Russia galvanized the opposition into working with legislators. Although our respondent from the SEU said that he prefers to participate in direct action than to lobby elected officials, he cancelled the summer camp, as mentioned above, and spent the entire season working with the State Duma (Interview, 2002). This example represents good democratic practice for environmental organizations, as well as their ability to mobilize resources and effectively work together. However, even with such cooperation, the opposition movement was unable to persuade the Russian government. This can be attributed to the manipulation of the Committee of Ecology by Minatom, which has strong influence and large amounts of money, making it difficult to oppose, especially in a country such as Russia with extremely undeveloped balance-of-power structures. Russia has established procedures for decision-making, such as hearings and expert commissions, that appear acceptable to the international community. However, the reality depicted in the case of foreign spent nuclear fuel legislation reveals that power structures are promoting their unchecked policies in an undemocratic manner in Russia. Activists in various countries believe that global security would be greatly increased by making arms control more transparent, the protection of nuclear materials more secure, and accidents less likely (24). This is of particular interest in Russia since it contains one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Democratic and diverse procedures for decision-making are indispensable in order to achieve these goals. How can a democratic civil society effectively develop when operations in the nuclear energy sector, a rather large aspect of Russian society, are hidden and protected from outside assessment? The U.S. government has diminished civil liberties as a preventative measure against terrorism, whereas in this particular situation in Russia, it is the inadequacy of civil and democratic rights that create danger from terrorism or accidents. Civil society is trying to insure the security of its citizens and the environment, and, therefore, blocking it is dangerous for national and international safety. The consistent circulation of unbiased information is also needed. Our respondent from the Center for Nuclear Ecology observed that it is much easier to work with Western journalists because they are not concerned with the interests of Minatom (Interview, 2002), referring to the newspaper Izvestsia as “Minatom’s word.” This research discovered more such deficiencies in one of the SEU’s informational campaigns. According to our respondent, residents near the Vuronezskaya nuclear power plant had only received information from official sources until the SEU created a presence there (Interview with SEU director of nuclear campaign, February 2002), when they provided alternative information and an opportunity to weigh evidence. This is the kind of diverse interaction necessary for checks and balances within a stable society. It seems that NGOs will play an important role in achieving such goals, since they can provide novel solutions to existing problems that the government is either unable or uninterested in developing. NGOs play a role as important sources of information for legislators as well as the public, since they serve as a pathway for communication between the government and the people. Unfortunately, the attempted communication in this case failed to prevent the importation of spent nuclear fuel from abroad, the effects of which extend beyond the political borders of Russia. There is an international belief that global security will be greatly increased if Russian people and governments are able build a stabile society in the post-communist period. |
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